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THE UNANIMOUS VERDICT:
POLITICS AND THE JURY TRIAL
GARY J. JACOBSOHN*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Trial by jury may be considered in two separate points of view:
as a judicial, and as a political institution."' Alexis de Tocqueville made
this statement in an attempt to demonstrate the important political ad-
vantages of the jury in a democratic polity. According to de Tocqueville,
the jury could best be understood and appreciated if regarded "above
all [as] a political institution."2 This Commentary focuses on the jury
as a judicial institution, but relies on several key political considerations
to elucidate the jury's unique character and function.
Specifically, this inquiry concerns the rule of unanimity, a traditional
attribute of jury trials. In 1972 the United States Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment guarantee of a jury trial, applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, does not require a unanimous
jury verdict. In Johnson v. Louisiana,3 the Court upheld a statute pro-
viding that only nine members of a jury of twelve must concur in a
verdict in trials for noncapital crimes punishable by hard labor; in
Apodaca v. Oregon,' the Court endorsed a similar provision requiring
the consent of at least ten jurors to a verdict of guilty. In each case
the Court's own verdict was far from unanimous, the four Nixon ap-
pointees and Justice White constituting a 5-4 majority.
The Justices' opinions relied upon history, logic, and empirical evi-
dence-references to politics did not appear. Crucial political ques-
tions are implicit in the opinions, however, although never explicitly
addressed. The constitutional debate over the rule of unanimity in
criminal jury trials raises issues of the first importance to democratic
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Williams College. B.A., 1967, City
College of New York; Ph.D., 1972, Cornell University.
1. 1 A. DE TOCQuEVILLE, DEMOCACY IN AMERICA 280 (P. Bradley ed. 1946).
2. Id. at 282.
3. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
4. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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theory-issues intrinsically interesting apart from their application to
the dispute about jury procedure.
This Commentary proposes that the rule of unanimity is not an
essential element of justice in a criminal trial if political and judicial
settings are carefully distinguished. The strongest constitutional defense
of the unanimity requirement, that it encourages the depth of deliberation
necessary for a just determination of guilt or innocence, assumes that
the jury's representative character resembles the representative character
of a democratic legislature. If the jury's function is distinguished from
the function of democratic political institutions, however, it appears
that due process does not mandate the rule of unanimity. Nevertheless,
although the Constitution should not be interpreted to require unanimous
verdicts in state criminal trials, considerations of political legitimacy
argue persuasively for retention by the states of the unanimity rule.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Court's sanction of nonunanimous verdicts, although an abrupt
break with centuries of common law experience, did not introduce
a procedure alien to the history of criminal jury trials. Although there
is some disagreement about the precise origins of the jury, it is clear
that these origins were not associated with the rule of unanimity. In
the ancient Scandinavian tribunals, for example, to which the earliest
juries have been traced, the opinion of the majority prevailed.5 Only
in 1367 did the English law institute the requirement that jury verdicts
be unanimous.'
By the end of the eighteenth century, the rule of unanimity had become
well established. Like much of the common law, however, the Americans
incorporated the unanimous jury into their criminal justice system with-
out adopting a constitutional provision requiring its use. Indeed, the Con-
stitution's only mention of the dimensions of a jury verdict is the require-
ment of a two-thirds majority of the Senate, acting as a jury, to convict 7
5. W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TIAL BY JuRy 203 (1875).
6. See 1 W. HoLDswonTr, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (3d ed. 1922).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. The Constitution does not explicitly refer to the
Senate as a jury, and it is debatable whether the Senate acts as a jury in impeachment
trials. Raoul Berger, the leading constitutional scholar on impeachment, considers it
an open question. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
83 (1973). For the purposes of this Commentary, it will be useful to view the Senate
as functioning as a jury, i.e., determining guilt or innocence.
[Vol. 1977:39
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/8
THE UNANIMOUS VERDICT
a person impeached by the House of Representatives.8 Impeach-
ment, which is essentially a political process, obviously differs from a
verdict in a criminal trial; that the former requires substantially less than
unanimity arguably justifies a unanimity requirement in the legal process.
That is, while it may be foolish to expect unanimity about matters in-
volving partisan sensibilities and conflicting political interests, unanimity
may be the only just and accurate way to determine guilt or innocence
based on factual evidence. However, one could argue that impeach-
ment of a public official entails more serious social consequences than
the trial of a defendant charged with burglary, and that adopting in
criminal trials the qualified majority rule applied in impeachment trials
is therefore reasonable.
The qualified majority rule is one of several examples of the Founding
Fathers' distrust of majoritarianism. By placing restraints upon the
simple majority, the Founders revealed their belief that justice is not
based upon formal political equality. The resulting minority power
to thwart the designs of the majority forces the polity to accept occa-
sionally the disproportionate influence of an individual member of the
minority vis-h-vis an individual member of the majority. The question
raised by the unanimous verdict requirement can thus be stated as
follows: Do the demands of justice in a criminal trial require a pro-
cedure that emphatically denies a key principle of democratic theory
-the principle of majority rule? In other words, does justice require
that a single individual be permitted to veto the will of the rest of the
group?
III. CALHOUN AND THE CONCURRENT MAJORITY
Even the well-documented suspicions of majority rule entertained by
the Founding Fathers did not lead them to "constitutionalize" any politi-
cal arrangement based on the rule of unanimity. In fact, John C.
Calhoun, whose rejection of the Founders' natural rights principles led
him to an even greater distrust of majorities, was the first American
political theorist to develop a systematic defense of the rule of unanimity.
This defense ultimately proved to be an unsatisfactory attempt to
establish the feasibility of unanimity as an operative political principle.
Nonetheless, Calhoun did succeed in demonstrating the practicability
of unanimity in jury decisionmaking. The jury's consensus about its
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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fundamental goal, coupled with the jurors' essential disinterest in the
result, renders jury unanimity a realistic alternative. In the legislative-
political context, however, the decisionmakers are spokesmen for partic-
ular interests and can rarely achieve the consensus necessary for una-
nimity.
Calhoun wanted to replace rule by the numerical majority (majority
rule) with rule by the concurrent majority. His principle of "govern-
ment by the concurrent majority" contemplated
giving to each interest . . . the means of protecting itself, by its
negative, against all measures calculated to advance the peculiar in-
terests of others at its expense. Its effect, then, is to cause the different
interests . . . to desist from attempting to adopt any measure calculated
to promote the prosperity of one, or more, by sacrificing that of others;
and thus to force them to unite in such measures only as would promote
the prosperity of all . .. .
Calhoun believed that rule by the numerical majority rested upon the
principle of force, whereas rule by the concurrent majority, which he
identified with constitutional government, was grounded in compro-
mise.'0 The great advantage of the concurrent majority, according to
Calhoun, was its assurance that no important decision would be made
unless it reflected the sense of the entire community. Because the
numerical majority permitted one part of the community to rule another
part, it constituted, in Calhoun's view, an absolute government of the
democratic regime." Government by the concurrent majority, on the
other hand, "excludes the possibility of oppression"' 2 by providing each
interest with a veto power over the actions of the rest of the community.
Calhoun anticipated the obvious objections to his theory. The objec-
tion that most concerned him was that "it would be impracticable to
obtain the concurrence of conflicting interests where they were numerous
and diversified."'-' The difficulty of achieving unanimity becomes an
especially serious problem in emergency situations requiring prompt,
concerted action. Calhoun conceded the difficulty of securing action
when no necessity dictated immediate action, but insisted that emergency
situations would engender compromise which in turn would lead to
9. J. CALHouN, A DISQUISrrION ON GOVERNMENT 38 (R. Cralle ed. 1943).
10. id. at 37.
11. Id. at 36.
12. Id. at 38.
13. Id. at 64.
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unanimity. He relied on the example of trial by jury to support this
argument.
Calhoun argued that while the unanimous jury verdict requirement
seems impracticable at first blush, closer examination reveals that the
rule not only succeeds but has proven to be "the safest, the wisest, and
the best [mode of trial] that human ingenuity has ever devised."'
He maintained that the jury's duty to reach a verdict created a "disposi-
tion to harmonize' that propelled the jurors to unanimity. The unani-
mous verdict requirement, Calhoun argued, tended to produce accurate
and just determinations:
If the necessity of unanimity were dispensed with and the finding of a
jury made to depend on a bare majority, jury trial, instead of being one
of the greatest improvements in the judicial department of govern-
ment, would be one of the greatest evils that could be inflicted on the
community. It would be, in such case, the conduit through which all
the factious feelings of the day would enter and contaminate justice at
its source.";
Calhoun argued that the same factors which caused jurors to reach
unanimity applied with even greater force to the various political in-
terests in the community. Whereas a jury's failure to reach a verdict
is unfortunate and inconvenient, the failure of the community interests
to agree to a course of action entails "fatal consequences" for the body
politic.' As jurors are motivated by a "love of truth and justice,"
interest groups in a government of the concurrent majority likewise
possess a "love of country" so strong that the impulse to compromise
is almost irresistible.' 7
Calhoun's theory fails to recognize that the community's attachment
to particular interests is much stronger than the jury's identification
with a particular trial. The juror has no personal stake (except perhaps
a psychological one) in the outcome of a trial. Moreover, when he
compromises to facilitate unanimity, his change of position will probably
remain private. The representative of a community interest, however,
cannot hide (though he may try to disguise) his compromises. More
importantly, the community representative must account to his con-
stituency and justify his failure to satisfy their demands. Unanimity
14. Id. at 66.
15. Id. at 66-67.
16. Id. at 67.
17. Id.
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on matters of minor importance might be feasible, but an abstract devo-
tion to "country" is unlikely to overcome self-interest on high saliency
issues that deeply divide the community.' 8
The crucial difference between the jury and the community, therefore,
is that the former entails initial agreement about the group's objective,
whereas disagreement over goals is almost always present in political
situations. This suggests an important distinction between the repre-
sentative functions performed by the two groups. Although the repre-
sentative character of the jury has always been deemed essential,19
jurors are not expected to carry out the desires of the community when
voting in a particular case; indeed, jurors are sometimes sequestered to
prevent communication between the representative and the represented.
Thus, the elected official's Burkean dilemma is no dilemma at all for
the juror; to the extent that the juror balances his view of the case
against his perception of the community's view, justice is subverted.
Despite his failure to demonstrate the practicability of the concurrent
majority, Calhoun nevertheless presented a logical argument, confirmed
by experience, that jury unanimity is not an unrealistic goal. What
remains to be determined is whether unanimity is also, as Calhoun
maintained, an essential ingredient of justice.
IV. THE JOHNSON AND APODACA OPINIONS
A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed with Calhoun's belief
that justice requires unanimity. Justice White noted at the outset of the
Johnson v. Louisiana20 opinion that the Court had never "held jury
unanimity to be a requisite of due process of law."2' 1 To justify its
refusal to require jury unanimity, the Court attempted in Johnson and
Apodaca v. Oregon22 to establish two fundamental, related principles:
First, that a nonunanimous verdict does not, of itself, constitute rea-
18. Calhoun himself argued that the defense of self-interest is the fundamental
rule of politics, since it is "in the constitution of our nature" to "feel more intensely
what affects us directly than what affects us indirectly through others. . . ." Id. at 4.
19. See T.F.T. PLUcy.NErr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 127-29 (Sth
ed. 1956), which discusses the origins of the jury and the expectations regarding its
representative character. See also Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 300 (1947) (Mur-
phy, I., dissenting); and Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946),
which refer to the jury as a representative institution.
20. 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
21. Id. at 359.
22. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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sonable doubt; and second, that a nonunanimous verdict does not negate
the requirement that jury panels reflect a cross section of the community.
If, after extensive and open discussion of the facts and issues of a
case, a majority of nine jurors cannot persuade a minority of three that
the defendant is guilty, the existence of that amount of doubt will not
violate the due process rights of the defendant under the system endorsed
in Johnson. If permitting nonunanimous jury verdicts discourages
extensive and open discussion, however, it raises a serious question
about whether the nine who favor conviction have deliberated sufficiently
to remove all reasonable doubt from their minds. As Justice Douglas'
dissent suggested, "[tihe diminution of verdict reliability flows from
the fact that nonunanimous juries need not debate and deliberate as
fully as must unanimous juries. 23  What worried Douglas was that a
jury, nine of whom agree to a verdict at the outset of deliberations, might
not expend much energy convincing the .holdouts or considering the
dissenters' arguments.
A majority of the Court felt that this thesis reflected an overly cynical
view of juror responsibility. Justice White wrote, "We have no grounds
for believing that majority jurors, aware of their responsibility and
power over the liberty of the defendant, would simply refuse to listen
to arguments presented to them in favor of acquittal, terminate discus-
sion, and render verdict. 24 Justice Powell added: "In part, at least,
the majority-verdict rule must rely on the same principle that underlies
our historic dedication to jury trial: both systems are premised on the
conviction that each juror will faithfully perform his assigned duty. '25
With this faith in the good sense and maturity of their fellow citizens,
the Court contended that a jury majority would outvote a minority
only after "reasoned discussion" had ceased to change anyone's mind.
If after such discussion the minority fails to persuade the majority of its
error, the verdict of a large majority of the jurors might reasonably be
considered accurate beyond a reasonable doubt .2  That three jurors
disagree does not, of itself, establish reasonable doubt; it merely estab-
lishes that, for whatever reason, three jurors will occasionally be wrong. 7
23. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 388 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 361.
25. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 361.
27. This reasoning becomes more problematic if applied to the minority's judgment
in a situation in which the verdict of a simple majority could prevail. Justice Black-
mun wrote, "I do not hesitate to say . . . that a system employing a 7-5 standard,
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The second and related principle, which the majority addressed in
Apodaca, concerns the jury's representative function. The dissenting
Justices' argument was essentially the same as Calhoun's argument for
concurrent majority rule. With respect to the constitutional require-
ment that juries be drawn from an accurate cross section of the com-
munity, Justice Brennan stated:
When verdicts must be unanimous, no member of the jury may be
ignored by the others. When less than unanimity is sufficient, con-
sideration of minority views may become nothing more than a matter
of majority grace. In my opinion, the right of all groups in this Nation
to participate in the criminal process means the Tight to have their
voices heard. A unanimous verdict vindicates that right. Majority
verdicts could destroy it.28
Justice Stewart's dissent in Johnson was blunter:
Under today's judgment, nine jurors can simply ignore the views of
their fellow panel members of a different race or class. . . . [c]ommu-
nity confidence in the administration of criminal justice cannot but be
corroded under a system in which a defendant who is conspicuously
identified with a particular group can be acquitted or convicted by a
jury split along group lines. 29
The majority, too, recognized the time-honored principle that the
jury represents the community from which it is selected. Justice Powell
argued, however, that the selection process, which permits peremptory
challenges for cause, offers sufficient protection against "representative
but wilfully irresponsible" juries.30 According to Justice Powell, this
rather than a 9-3 or 75% minimum, would afford me great difficulty." Id. at 366
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Douglas also was troubled by this point: 'Today
the Court approves a nine-to-three verdict. Would the Court relax the standard of
reasonable doubt still further by resorting to eight-to-four verdicts, or even a majority
rule?" Id. at 393 (Douglas, 3., dissenting). One response to this argument is that
the Court could simply draw the line at nine-to-three, reasoning that jury verdicts,
like other constitutional decisions, are important enough to require an extraordinary
majority.
28. Id. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 397-98 (Stewart, 3., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall cx-
panded on this theme in his dissent:
Each time this Court has approved a change in the familiar characteristics
of the jury, we have reaffirmed the principle that its fundamental characteristic
is its capacity to render a commonsense, layman's judgment, as a representa-
tive body drawn from the community. To fence out a dissenting juror fences
out a voice from the community, and undermifies the principle on which our
whole notion of the jury now rests.
Id. at 402 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring). The Constitution does not require that all
[Vol. 1977:39
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system insures that determinations of guilt or innocence are based on
evidence rather than prejudice.
More directly responsive to Calhoun's argument was Justice White's
opinion in Apodaca. He maintained that to perceive the juror as a
protector of the interests of his particular group in the community
misconstrues the jury's function. "No group . .. has the right to
block convictions; it has only the right to participate in the overall legal
processes by which criminal guilt and innocence are determined."3
The concurrent majority theory, in other words, is inappropriate in the
criminal process. The dissenting Justices' argument, however, was not
that groups of jurors should have this right, but that when prejudice
influences the judgment of a substantial majority of jurors, the minority
should be able to defend itself and the defendant against this prejudice.
One of the dissenters, Justice Douglas, went so far as to accuse his
colleagues in the majority of revealing a "law and order" judicial men-
tality32 and abandoning the traditional presumption of innocence for
the "tradition of the inquisition."33  Such rhetorical excess does not
really clarify the Court's basic division. To extract from the various
opinions an explanation for the division requires a careful distinction
between two views of how the jury actually operates. The majority
assumed the best about the jury-that the jury is aware of its responsi-
bility, follows the judge's instructions, and seeks only the truth. The
minority Justices, on the other hand, accepted the judicial realist's
separation of "myth and reality in American justice' and were skeptical
of the jury's ability to live up to its responsibilities. From the perspec-
tive of the majority, it is reasonable for states to permit nonunanimous
verdicts without fear of undermining justice, whereas the minority's
perspective views the unanimity rule as an auxiliary protection against
the defects of human nature. This is not to suggest that the majority
was prepared to acknowledge only the nobler instincts of humankind;
indeed, Justice Powell noted that "[r]emoval of the unanimity require-
ment could well minimize the potential for hung juries occasioned either
groups in the community be represented on the jury; it forbids only systematic exclusion
of members of identifiable groups or classes. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
208-09 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325
U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945).
31. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972).
32. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 393 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 394 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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by bribery or juror irrationality. '3 4 The implication, however, is that
bribery and irrationality influence only one, two, or three individuals.
To assume otherwise requires use of the unanimity rule, for if nine jurors
act irrationally (ruling on racial grounds, for example), then justice
can only be achieved through a hung jury.
V. UNANIMITY AND LEGITIMACY
It might be helpful at this point to consider the unanimous verdict
issue as a problem of political legitimacy. Legitimacy in a political
context refers to "the capacity of a political system to engender and
maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appro-
priate or proper ones for the society." '35 With respect to individual
institutions, legitimacy requires-a demonstration that the way decisions
are made is consistent with, or appropriate for, the purpose of the insti-
tution as well as the nature of the decisions. In other words, when it
appears that the method of making a decision subverts the end commonly
associated with the decisionmaking body, a problem (or crisis, depending
on the importance of the decision) of legitimacy may be said to exist. For
example, if a university with a tradition of academic excellence adopted
a policy of admitting students on a lottery basis, it might suffer a fatal
loss of legitimacy in the eyes of its financial supporters.
Under what circumstances is unanimity related to legitimacy? Per-
haps the most obvious example is a situation in which a crucial decision
must be made in the absence of social consensus. The unanimity of the
Supreme Court's landmark school segregation decision of 1954, for
instance, is frequently cited as an example of judicial statesmanship. A
less clear-cut decision in Brown v. Board of Education0 might have
exacerbated racial tensions in the relevant communities. Ideally, of
course, unanimity would be an appropriate requirement for all the
decisions of a nonelected body charged with rendering final interpre-
tations of the fundamental law of the land. As every schoolboy knows,
however, the language of the Constitution is ambiguous, making consti-
tutional interpretation an unlikely subject of unanimity among nine
strong-willed jurists. To require unanimity in all Supreme Court rulings
would undermine the Court's effectiveness as a decisionmaking body
34. Id. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring).
35. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 69, 86 (1959).
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and, by diminishing its capacity to perform its assigned task, undermine
its legitimacy as well.17
As Heinz Eulau has observed, unanimity is also "celebrated as a
political achievement" in crisis situations that threaten the survival of
the community.3 s This principle, which underlies Calhoun's concurrent
majority theory, is most dramatically evident in the unanimity require-
ment of the United Nations Security Council. In the international
community, in which a system of shared values does not exist and
collective decisions affect the self-determination of individual nations,
the concurrent majority is most defensible. Calhoun, on the other
hand, wanted to defend the institution of slavery, which the majority
regarded as offensive to the fundamental beliefs of the political com-
munity. Denying the majority the power to act under these circum-
stances is significantly different from permitting a veto power in the
"'State of Nature" situation in which nation-states find themselves.
The relationship of unanimity to legitimacy is a familiar one in
social contract theory, most notably in Locke's political philosophy.
Unanimous consent constitutes the underpinning of civil society. "Men
being . . . by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be
put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another
without his own consent."39  While only unanimity can confer the
title to rule, however, majority rule constitutes the operative principle of
ruling. "For when any number of men have, by the consent of every
individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community
one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will
and determination of the majority." 0  Because a civil society must
be governed, and because disagreements inevitably arise within any
community, nonunanimous decisionmaking must usually prevail; it
is both legitimate and unavoidable. As Eulau wrote, "A democratic
legislature is an institution composed of opposing sides, and the more
the lines of division follow predictable lines, the more rational would
37. As Lipset has pointed out, a regime's legitimacy may enable it to survive a crisis
of effectiveness. An instiLution perceived to be performing an important function, how-
ever, is unlikely to survive a crisis of legitimacy if it becomes consistently incapable of
performing.
38. Eulau, Logics of Rationality in Unanimous Decision-Making, in NoMos VII:
RATIONAL DECISION 29 (C. Friedrich ed. 1964).
39. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CiviL GovERNMENT AND A LETrT CONCERN-
INO TOLERATION § 95, at 48 (J. Gough ed. 1946).
40. Id. § 96, at 48.
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the legislative process seem to be."'41 These principles, of course, rest
on the assumption that the divisions are not of a character such as to
destroy the fundamental consensus that justifies the existence of popular
government.
VI. UNANIMITY AND JURY LEGITIMACY
Is the rule of unanimity related to the legitimacy of the jury? Be-
cause most jury decisions are irrevocable and carry such grave conse-
quences for the defendant, it is reasonable to assume that the community
thinks it important for the jury to render correct decisions. Arguably,
the accuracy of a jury's decision is more important than the accuracy
of the legislature's in any given case, since the legislature can reverse
its decision. If the community in fact attaches extraordinary importance
to a jury's arriving at the truth, then it is necessary to determine whether
a unanimous verdict is more likely to produce an accurate result than
a nonunanimous verdict. The unanimous verdict requirement may
enhance the jury's legitimacy simply because the public believes that
unanimity is more likely to produce truth. Arguably, however, a
unanimous verdict requirement produces less truthful results. In that
case, the legitimacy fostered by the unanimity principle rests upon a
popular misconception that the requirement produces truth and justice.
This seeming paradox will be explored in detail; first, however, it is
necessary to elucidate what is unique about the jury as a governmental
institution.
Unlike the democratic legislature, the jury is not a governing body
in the textbook sense of an institution formulating general rules for the
regulation of society. It is, however, the community's representative
in judging guilt or innocence with respect to individual violations of these
general rules. Thus, in the entire scheme of government, the jury's
critical function warrants calling it an official governmental institution.
The jury is a unique governmental institution, however, because of
the irrevocable nature of most of its decisions and the criteria it applies
in making those decisions. A jury's guilty verdict can, of course, be
reversed on appeal. When such reversals occur, however, they are
usually based upon matters of law, i.e., errors committed by judges
or law enforcement officials rather than juries. For example, when a
trial judge rules incorrectly on an evidence question, an appellate court's
41. Eulau, supra note 38, at 29.
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reversal of the guilty verdict does not indicate that the jury's finding
of guilt on the basis of the facts was erroneous. The trial judge, of
course, can correct the jury's errors by entering a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict if it is clear that the jury failed to follow the relevant law.
In this respect judge and jury compose a system of checks and balances.
Jurors are amateurs with respect to legal questions, so trial and appellate
judges, as experts in the law, may reverse jury decisions that are incorrect
by virtue of the jurors' amateur status. The jury's factual determina-
tions, however, are irrevocable, since both judge and jury are presumed
to be equally expert (or equally inexpert) finders of fact. The judge
may direct a verdict only when he believes that no reasonable person
could reach a decision different from his own. By doing so, he implies
that the jury could reach a different result only by misapplying the
applicable law.
These reflections lead to a reconsideration of the debate about the
reasonable doubt standard. An inverse relationship exists between the
irrevocability of decisions (particularly in matters as important as crim-
inal liability) and the amount of error that the system can tolerate. The
legitimacy of majoritarian legislative decisionmaking resides partially
in the knowledge that if the majority is proved wrong it may lose its
majority status and its power to dictate public policy. It is interesting
to note, therefore, that in early jury systems, when unanimity was not
required, minority jurors were subject to punishment by the state for
deliberately disregarding the applicable law.42 In present day America,
punishment of dissenting jurors is unthinkable, yet the underlying
rationale-that there is only one correct decision in matters of guilt
or innocence-is not seriously questioned. The function of the jury,
as Blackstone said, is to examine "the truth of every accusation,"44 and
truth, as the philosophers tell us, is the highest and most difficult stand-
ard upon which to base one's actions.
At this point it is essential to consider the relationship between the
rule of unanimity and the jury's obligation to pursue the truth. It has
been observed that "[tihe requirement of extraordinary majorities for
42. See W. FORSYTH, supra note 5, at 199; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 6, at
337-47.
43. A similar argument might be applied to crisis unanimity. When the stakes
are so high as to call into question the very survival of the community, it makes polit-
ical sense to speak of the possibility of only one correct decision.
44. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMIMENTARIES *349.
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extraordinary purposes is a device for compelling fuller consideration
. . "' The Senate filibuster is frequently defended on these grounds,
although the goal of a filibuster is usually delay and obstruction rather
than fuller consideration of the issues. Stated another way, "it makes
sense for an individual to express his policy preference only so long
as he has still a chance to affect the outcome of the decisionmaking. '40
Logically, under the rule of unanimity, it always makes sense for an
individual to express his opposition to a proposed policy." Another
theorist has observed:
There is much to be said against the unanimity-principle as a criterion
of right in an organized society, but there is this to be said in its favor:
that where action can be taken under it at all there is some sort of
presumption that the action taken is the wisest and most reasonable of
which the deliberators are, as a group, capable. Every disputant among
them must have been heard and convinced before action becomes pos-
sible; every suggestion that the action about to be taken is unwise or
unjust must have been refuted to the satisfaction of him who has put
it forward. By providing a maximum of guarantees against new de-
cisions of all kinds, it provides a maximum of guarantees against new
decisions which are unwise or unjust . . . The unanimity principle
. ..forces the deliberators to observe the basic rules of the reasoning
process: consideration of all evidence available, attribution of equal
weight to all points of view, etc ..... 48
While these arguments tend to support the reasoning of the minority
Justices in Johnson and Apodaca, the statements were made in a polit-
ical context, and their application to the jury system must be carefully
scrutinized. In a majority or qualified majority situation, when repre-
sentatives of identifiable political interests fail to observe the "basic
rules of the reasoning process" in their deliberations, their failure is easy
to understand from a political standpoint. Their behavior is designed
to further their interests, not necessarily to find the truth. Since the
jury is principally interested in pursuing the truth, however, its failure
to observe the basic rules is, if not incomprehensible, clearly inconsistent
with the jury's purpose and its presumed interest.
45. Pennock, Responsiveness, Responsibility, and Majority Rule, 46 AM. POL.
Scr. REv. 790, 807 (1952).
46. E. BERG, DEMOCRACY AND THE MAJORITY PRINCIPLE 148 (1965).
47. Id.
48. W. Kendall, John Locke and the Doctrine o1 Majority-Rule, in 26 ILLINOIS
STUIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES No. 2, at 109 (1941).
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Admittedly, however, compliance with the rules of deliberation en-
gendered by the unanimity requirement does not necessarily lead to
the truth. Calhoun himself pointed out that the unanimity requirement
facilitates compromise, which he believed to be the most fundamental
political virtue. "Compromise, [however], is a matter neither of theo-
retical truth nor of inherently right action. It means . . . that the
preferences of other people are taken into account, not because of their
substantive quality, but simply because they are the preferences of
others." Justice Powell made a similar observation: "[Tihe rule
that juries must speak with a single voice often leads, not to full agree-
ment among the 12 but to agreement by none and compromise by all,
despite the absence of a rational basis for such compromise. '' 50 Guilt
or innocence, moreover, is a question that admits of no compromise,
although there is room for compromise about the degree of guilt (i.e.,
what crime has been committed) and the nature of the punishment.
More problematic, however, are situations in which individual jurors
under the intense pressure to reach unanimity compromise their own
judgments to avoid deadlock."
The danger of this kind of compromise is illustrated by the so-called
"Allen charge" (sometimes known as the "dynamite charge"), by which
the trial judge cajoles a jury to seek unanimity. Kalven and Zeisel ob-
served that "[c]oncern about the Allen charge has been mounting on
two grounds: That it may give the jury the impression that the judge
agrees with the majority position on the jury, and that he is in fact
suggesting to the minority that it capitulate without being convinced. 52
The jury's objective--discovering the "truth"-is perhaps more ac-
curately described as "the truth as perceived by twelve individual jurors."
While it may be unsatisfying to be forced to consider two versions of
the "truth," decisions based upon the honest perceptions of nine jurors
49. E. BRG, supra note 46, at 143-44 (1965).
50. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Relevant here is a conclusion that appears in the most extensive empirical
analysis of the jury system undertaken to this date. "Mhe deliberation process al-
though rich in human interest and color appears not to be at the heart of jury decision-
making. Rather, deliberation is the route by which small group pressures produce con-
sensus out of the initial majority." H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, TI AMERiCAN Juir 496
(1966).
52. Id. at 454. In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the Supreme
Court gave constitutional sanction to a trial judge's suggestion that "the minority Eon
the jury] ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correct-
ness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority." Id. at 501.
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may be more principled than unanimous verdicts that do not connote
honest agreement. 5'
In short, it seems impossible to prove that the unanimous verdict
requirement is positively associated with the jury's sense of obligation
to pursue the truth. The most that can be said is that the rule of
unanimity, as applied in the jury system, supports the basic rules of the
reasoning process, and that it may be a necessary safeguard when extra-
neous considerations (e.g., prejudice) significantly influence the jury's
deliberations. In some cases, unanimity will promote the objectives of
the jury system; in others it will subvert those ends.
This conclusion, however, is not directly responsive to the question
whether unanimity is essential to the jury's legitimacy. Legitimacy
contemplates more than an institution's capacity to perform the duties
society assigns to it; legitimacy also requires a popular belief that the
institution is performing as expected. That nonunanimous verdicts may
produce more accurate determinations than unanimous verdicts produce
is not, standing alone, an adequate defense of the legitimacy of non-
unanimous verdicts. As discussed earlier, the method of decisionmaking
must be consistent with the purpose of the institution and the nature
of the decision. The jury's legitimacy, therefore, depends upon a
widespread belief that the process the jury utilizes to determine guilt or
innocence is consistent with the irrevocable and grave nature of the
decision.
Ultimately, it must be determined whether a nonunanimous jury
verdict implies inaccuracy. Is the community satisfied that guilt has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt when one, two, or three jurors
opposed the guilty verdict? Unlike the Supreme Court, which explains
in detail the reasoning behind its decisions, the jury does not announce
its reasoning; consequently, the community cannot evaluate the relative
merits of differing perceptions of the truth. When unanimous verdicts
are required, the public is similarly unable to discover the compromises
that may have been necessary to attain unanimity. Logic suggests, there-
fore, that public confidence in jury verdicts, and thus in the jury system,
will be higher when verdicts are unanimous. If empirical analysis sub-
53. For an interesting examination of this situation in a political context, see Zuck-
erman, The Social Context of Democracy in Massachusetts, 25 WM. & MAtRY Q. 523
(3d ser. 1968). Zuckerman discusses the colonial New England town meeting, where
unanimity frequently reflected "the absence of any socially sanctioned role for dissent."
Id. at 539. See also A. VIDICH & J. BENSMAN, SMALL TowN IN MAN SOCIETY 112-14,
129-31 (1960) for a discussion of this problem in a contemporary rural political setting.
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stantiates this proposition, a strong argument for requiring unanimity
is made.
How does the above discussion relate to the constitutional question?
The Supreme Court framed the issue in Johnson as "whether unanimity
is in fact so fundamental to the essentials of jury trial that this particular
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is necessarily binding on the States
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."54  To
answer this question one must distinguish between legitimacy and justice.
The unanimity rule may be related to the legitimacy of the jury trial but
unrelated to the jury's capacity to render a just verdict. If so, the con-
stitutional question becomes whether due process requirements should
reflect legitimacy as well as justice. If the public perceives a direct
connection between unanimous verdicts and justice, should the Court
incorporate the popular view into its interpretation of due process even
if the existence of such a connection may be impossible to prove?
This is a very complicated question, a complete answer to which is
beyond the scope of this inquiry. The Supreme Court certainly has an
interest in the legitimacy of American institutions, particularly an institu-
tion at the heart of the criminal process. For this reason, it is important
to examine closely the Court's precise holding. In his concurring opin-
ion in Johnson, Justice Powell distinguished himself from the other four
majority Justices who were prepared to remove the unanimity require-
ment from federal as well as state trials. Thus, Justice Powell's conclu-
sion that "unanimity is one of the indispensable features of federal jury
trial" ' in effect became the decision of the court. According to Powell,
unanimity is indispensable "not because unanimity is necessarily fun-
damental to the function performed by the jury, but because that result
is mandated by history."56
54. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 357.
55. Id. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis original).
56. Id. at 370. (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, in dissent, raised the
obvious question, one the Court has often faced in interpreting the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment: "The result of today's decisions is anomalous: though
unanimous jury decisions are not required in state trials, they are constitutionally re-
quired in federal prosecutions. How can that be possible when both decisions stem
from the Sixth Amendment?" Id. at 383. Justice Powell, however, did not argue that
unanimity was indispensable to the jury's function or an essential element of justice.
A procedural safeguard may be indispensable (though not essential to due process)
at one jurisdictional level but dispensable (at least for purposes of experimentation) at
another level.
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This result seems to be a sensible one. The Court recognized that a
sudden and general reversal of the centuries-old unanimity rule could
undermine the legitimacy of the jury as an institution. By permitting
states to experiment with nonunanimous verdicts, however, Johnson and
Apodaca offer an opportunity to measure the extent to which the legit-
imacy of the jury decision actually rests upon popular expectation of
unanimity-experimentation that would be totally unwarranted if una-
nimity were known to be essential to criminal justice. After Johnson and
Apodaca, state officials will be forced to respond to any crisis of legit-
imacy caused by the institution of a qualified majority verdict.
VII. CONCLUSION
"The certainty required to prove a man guilty. . . is that which de-
termines every man in the most important transactions of his life. '' 7
This observation by Beccaria, an influential eighteenth century legal
thinker and criminologist, states the decisive consideration in our analysis
of the unanimous verdict. The "certainty" that Beccaria refers to is
achieved by adopting a reasonable doubt standard to guide the individual
juror, and a procedure through which the community becomes convinced
of the jury's compliance with that standard. While a unanimous verdict
may be necessary to maintain the community's trust in the jury's capacity
to do justice, its effect on juror responsibility can be either positive or
negative.
The issues of juror responsibility and political legitimacy, significant
as they are, do not address the problem of unanimity from the accused's
viewpoint. Obviously, the difference between a unanimous and non-
unanimous verdict can be crucial to the defendant-the rule of unanimity
lessens his chance of being convicted. It is clearly in the accused's in-
terest to retain the unanimous verdict requirement.58
The community, however, is interested in providing fair trials (i.e.,
trials that lead to acquittal of the innocent and conviction of the
guilty) in the most efficient manner. Thus, the public may favor a
system that reduces the number of hung juries but also assures the ac-
cused a fair trial. Reducing the number of hung juries-which constitute
57. C. BEccA rI, ON CRIMES AND PUNIsHMENTs 21 (1963).
58. See, in this regard, Nagel and Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optl-
mum Jury Size and Fraction Required to Convict, 1975 WAsH. U.L.Q. 933. The authors
develop a mathematical model to dispute Justice White's contention that the fraction
required to convict will have no effect on reliability or accuracy. They point out,
however, that the empirical premises of their model have not been tested.
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more than five percent of all juries'-9-would alleviate the crowded con-
dition of court dockets and might enhance the legitimacy of the judicial
system. One way to reduce the number of hung juries is to abandon the
unanimity requirement while retaining the reasonable doubt standard.
Kalven and Zeisel estimate that if juries could return 10/2 or 11/1 ver-
dicts, the number of hung juries would drop by 42 percent. 60 This pro-
posal poses an interesting dilemma for the accused. If he fears convic-
tion by a jury majority, he may waive his right to a jury trial in favor
of a bench trial. In doing so, however, he confronts mathematical proof
that, as a general rule, juries adhere to a stricter view of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt than judges do."'
Another method of reducing the number of hung juries is to retain the
unanimity requirement but to adopt a less exacting standard of probable
guilt. The effect of this innovation is difficult to predict; at any rate,
it is so foreign to Anglo-Saxon traditions of criminal justice that it is a
political impossibility. The Supreme Court's willingness to permit state
experimentation with nonunanimous verdicts almost certainly would not
extend to allowing experimentation with less stringent standards of proof,
because "the certainty required to prove a man guilty" often would be
lacking both in the community and in the jury itself.62
Both the public and the accused may object to any tampering with
the unanimity requirement or the reasonable doubt standard of proof.
Nonunanimous verdicts, however, may satisfy the community's interest in
(as opposed to the community's opinion about) fair and efficient trials.
While it probably makes sense as a policy matter to require unanimity in
criminal jury verdicts, it is doubtful that the rule of unanimity is essential
to constitutional due process.
59. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 51, at 453.
60. Id. at 461.
61. Id. at 189.
62. Experiments conducted to evaluate the Anglo-American adversary system's
capacity to produce objective and rational decisions revealed that "the adversary role
structure seems most congruent with a public policy requiring overwhelming proof
before a verdict can be rendered." Lind, Thibaut, & Walker, Discovery and Presenla-
tion of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 1129,
1143 (1973).
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